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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Sasha Martinez appeals judgment and sentence for robbery. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Martinez participated with Enrique Espinoza and at least one other woman 
in the armed robbery of an Idaho Fails Common Cents convenience store. (PSI, 
pp. 2-3.) The robbers, two women armed with knives and one man (Espinoza) 
armed with a bat entered the store, threatened store employees, destroyed 
property, and stole $120 in cash and $254 worth of cigarettes. (Id.) Although it 
was disputed whether Martinez was one of two armed women who entered the 
store with Espinoza, it was undisputed that Martinez entered the store to disable 
the security recording device in anticipation of the robbery. (PSI, pp. 3-4.) The 
state charged Martinez with one count of robbery, to which Martinez pled guilty. 
(R., pp. 22-23, 30-35; 4/7/11 Tr., p. 5, L. 10 - p. 6, L. 21; p. 11, Ls. 9-17.) 
The district court sentenced Martinez to fifteen years with three years 
determinate and retained jurisdiction for 365 days. (R., pp. 38-39,49-52; 5/26/11 
Tr., p. 67, L. 23 - p. 68, L. 13.) The district court relinquished jurisdiction less 
than four months later. (R., p. 59.) Martinez moved for reconsideration (R., pp. 
60-73), which the district court denied (R., pp. 74-76). Martinez filed a timely 
notice of appeal. (R., pp. 79-81.) 
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ISSUES 
states the issues on appeal as: 
1. VVhether the district court erroneously permitted Mr. 
Espinoza's statement to be read into the record without 
affording Ms. Martinez the opportunity to confront Mr. 
Espinoza or present rebuttal evidence. 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by improperly 
limiting the evidence available, both at the sentencing 
hearing and the Rule 35 hearing. 
3. Whether the district court's numerous errors entitle Ms. 
Martinez to relief pursuant to the cumulative error doctrine. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 6.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Martinez argues for a confrontation right at sentencing without 
acknowledging controlling authority against her position. Must Martinez's 
argument be rejected because she has failed to request that controlling 
authority be overruled? 
2. Has Martinez failed to show the district court abused its discretion when it 
denied Martinez's request to re-open the defense's presentation to allow 
for a third co-defendant to address the prosecution's sentencing 
argument? 
3. Has Martinez failed to show reversible error in the district court's refusal to 
allow Martinez to call her mother to make a statement during the hearing 
on Martinez's motion for reconsideration of the order relinquishing 
jurisdiction? 
4. Does Martinez's cumulative error claim fail because the cumUlative error 
doctrine does not apply at sentencing? In the alternative, has Martinez 




Martinez Has Failed To Request Reversal Of Existing Controlling Authority That 
Forecloses Her Argument For Confrontation Rights At Sentencing 
Introduction 
At sentencing, Martinez's trial counsel relied upon her statement to police 
to try and downplay her role in the robberies and claim it was Espinoza who 
was the driving force behind the crime. (5/26/11 , p. Ls. 3-23; p. 36, Ls. 9-
24; p. 43, L. 1 - p. 44, L. 6.) He asserted that Martinez did not initially tell the 
police what happened because Espinoza told her not to, then Espinoza "spilled 
his guts trying to blame most of this on her, as though she were the instigator in 
it." (5/26/11 Tr., p. 43, Ls. 14-18.) Counsel asserted Espinoza thereafter wrote 
Martinez a letter saying, "You can tell what happened. I don't care." (5/26/11 Tr., 
p. 43, Ls. 16-20.) In rebuttal, the prosecutor read Espinoza's statement of events 
surrounding the robbery. (5/26/11 Tr., p. 51, L. 23 - p. 55, L. 24.1) 
As the prosecutor read Espinoza's statement the defense made two 
objections. Initially the objection was: "This is a statement he has written." 
(5/26/11 Tr., p. 52, Ls. 13-14.) The district court, apparently interpreting the 
objection as based on hearsay, denied this objection on the grounds that the 
rules of evidence did not apply at sentencing. (5/26/11 Tr., p. 52, Ls. 15-18.) 
Shortly thereafter the objection was that counsel had "no chance" to "cross-
1 The statement as read by the prosecutor closely parallels the account of 
Espinoza's statement contained in the police reports attached to the PSI. 
(Compare 5/26/11 Tr., p. 52, L. 10 - p. 55, L. 21 with 2/28/11 Case Summary 
Report, pp. 10-11 (attached to PSI).) 
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(5/26/11 Tr., p. 53, Ls. 21-24.) The district court denied this 
ground that it was part of 
on in argument. (5/26/11 Tr., p. 
same statement that defense 
L. 25- ,L.11.) 
On appeal, Espinoza argues the district court erred because the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment applies at sentencing and 
because due process requires cross-examination. (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-13.) 
Espinoza fails, however, to recognize, much less argue for the reversal of, 
controlling precedent holding that there is no confrontation right at sentencing. 
Having failed to show that controlling authority should be overruled, she has 
failed to state a viable claim of error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Idaho jurisprudence requires respect for its own precedent. The rule of 
stare decisis dictates that controlling precedent be followed "unless it is 
manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless 
overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy 
continued injustice." State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002); 
State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 660, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000) (quoting 
Houghrand Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990)); 
see also State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 1001, 842 P.2d 660, 680 (1992) 
("[P]rior decisions of this Court should govern unless they are manifestly wrong 
or have proven over time to be unjust or unwise."); State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho 
384, 38~, 871 P.2d 801, 805 (1994) ("Having previously decided this question, 
and being presented with no new basis upon which to consider the issue, [the 
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Court guided by principle of stare decisis to adhere the as 
res:sea in earlier opinions."); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 
P.2d 1, 1 108 (1991) (McDevitt, J., specially concurring). 
C. Authoritv Holds That There Is No Confrontation Right At 
"[T]he sixth amendment to the United States Constitution does not 
that a [criminal] defendant be afforded the opportunity to confront and cross-
examine live witnesses in his sentencing proceedings." Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 
197,216,731 P.2d 192,211 (1986). See also State v. Wolverton, 120 Idaho 
559,563,817 P.2d 1083, 1087 (Ct. App. 1991) ("the sixth amendment does not 
require that a defendant have the opportunity to confront and cross-examine 
adverse witnesses in his sentencing proceedings"). Due process likewise does 
not require live testimony subject to cross-examination at sentencing. Williams v. 
New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250-51 (1949). The Idaho Court of Appeals has 
previously found the same argument advocated by Martinez "unmeritorious." 
State v. Guerrero, 130 Idaho 311, 312, 940 P.2d 419, 420 (Ct. App. 1997). 
This case is indistinguishable from Sivak, in which the Idaho Supreme 
Court held that the defendant did not have the right to have his co-defendant 
testify live and be subject to cross-examination at sentencing. Sivak, 112 Idaho 
at 214-15, 731 P.2d at 209-10. The Court reasoned that "the full disclosure of 
information provided to a sentencer in a presentence report is sufficient to protect 
a [criminal] defendant's interests. He need not have the actual live witnesses 
whose statements are contained in the report present at the sentencing hearing 
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so long as he is afforded opportunity to explain and to argue the veracity of 
those statements the judge." kL at 215, 731 210. 
Controlling precedents there is no confrontation right 
sentencing and that due process is satisfied where the defendant has the 
opportunity to address statements in the PSI. These precedents foreclose 
Martinez's argument that the Confrontation Clause or due process requires the 
presentation of live witnesses subject to cross-examination at criminal 
sentencing. Martinez's failure acknowledge controlling precedent, much less 
argue for its reversal, renders her argument meritless. 
II. 
The District Court Did Not Unduly Restrict The Presentation Of Evidence At 
Sentencing 
A. Introduction 
At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, when invited by the trial court, 
the defense declined to call any witnesses. (5/25/11 Tr., p. 7, Ls. 9-11.) The 
state presented one of the two victims, who gave a statement. (5/25/11 Tr., p. 7, 
L. 12 - p. 9, L. 9.) The district court then invited the defense to make its 
sentencing argument. (5/25/11 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 10-12.) 
Martinez's trial counsel argued that Martinez's history and mental health 
were mitigating. (5/25/11 Tr., p. 9, L. 15 - p. 13, L. 6.) Counsel then claimed 
Martinez had been accepted into mental health court. (5/25/11 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 7-
11.) Both the trial court and the prosecutor indicated they had no record of any 
acceptance into mental health court. (5/25/11 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 12-25.) The district 
court set over the hearing until the next day to ascertain whether Martinez had 
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been accepted into the mental health court. (5/25/11 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 13-14; p. 19, 
L. 19 - p. L. 3.) 
The next day the district court found that Martinez had applied for mental 
health court but had not been accepted because she was "found not to have 
sufficient mental health needs or substance abuse needs to qualify for any of the 
problem solving courts." (5/26/11 Tr., p. 28, L. 3 - p. 29, L. 5.) 
Martinez's counsel presented argument that Martinez was a good 
candidate for probation, addressing factors already covered the day before and 
new factors. (5/26/11 Tr., p. 29, L. 9 - p. 49, L. 15.) One of the arguments 
counsel for Martinez presented was that Espinoza "controll[ed]," "manipulat[ed]," 
and "pressur[ed]" Martinez into participating in the robbery. (5/26/11 Tr., p. 35, L. 
2 - p. 36, L. 24; p. 43, L. 1 - p. 44, L. 6.) The prosecutor responded by arguing 
for prison and not probation or retained jurisdiction. (5/26/11 Tr., p. 49, L. 20 - p. 
56, L. 25.) As part of his argument the prosecutor read Espinoza's statement of 
events to rebut the claim that Martinez was not a fully voluntary participant in the 
robbery. (5/26/11 Tr., p. 52, L. 10 - p. 55, L. 24.) 
After both sides presented their sentencing recommendations, Martinez's 
counsel moved to reopen the presentation of evidence to present a witness to 
rebut the statement read by the prosecutor, but the district court denied the 
motion. (5/26/11 Tr., p. 57, Ls. 2-13.) Martinez then exercised her right of 
allocution. (5/26/11 Tr., p. 57, L. 16 - p. 63, L. 20.) 
On appeal Martinez claims the district court "erred by unduly restricting the 
evidence in the record, and thus, unreasonably limited its discretion" by denying 
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the motion to reopen the presentation of evidence. (Appellant's brief, 13.) 
record, shows no abuse of discretion. 
Standard Of Review 
"The decision whether to reopen a case receive additional evidence 
before final judgment involves an exercise of discretion and will not be disturbed 
absent a showing that such discretion was abused." Printcraft Press, Inc. v. 
Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., _Idaho _,283 P.3d 757, 774-75 (2012) 
C. Martinez Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion By Denying Her Motion To Re-Open The Presentation Of 
Evidence At Sentencing 
A court has "inherent power to regulate its calendar, to efficiently manage 
the cases before it." Department of Labor and Indus. Servo V. East Idaho Mills, 
Inc., 111 Idaho 137, 138-39, 721 P.2d 736, 737-38 (Ct. App. 1986) (internal 
citations omitted). This inherent power must be weighed against the court's duty 
to "do substantial justice." JsL When a party seeks to reopen to present evidence 
"it must show some reasonable excuse, such as oversight, inability to produce 
the evidence, or ignorance of the evidence." Printcraft Press, Inc., _ Idaho at 
_, 283 P.3d at 775 (internal quotations omitted). 
Here, Martinez presented no reasonable excuse why she failed to present 
testimony when the court invited the defense to present its sentencing evidence. 
Martinez could have rebutted Espinoza's statement, paraphrased in the police 
reports attached to the PSI (Case Summary Report (2/28/2011) pp. 10-11 
(attached to PSI)), at that time. Apparently Martinez's counsel did not see fit to 
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evidence until the prosecution specifically relied upon it at sentencing. 
has failed to show any excusable neglect for why did not 
testimony when the court asked both sides to present any additional 
evidence they wanted considered, she has failed show an abuse of discretion. 
Martinez points out that a "district court cannot unreasonably limit the 
it considers when considering the appropriateness of a sentence." 
(Appellant's brief, p. 13.) While it is certainly true that a district court may not 
arbitrarily prevent the presentation of evidence, such does not mean that judges 
have no control over the presentation of evidence at sentencing. Martinez's 
counsel waived the opportunity to present additional evidence. (5/25/11 Tr., p. 
7, Ls. 9-11.) Whether to excuse that waiver and allow the defense the 
opportunity to reopen the presentation of evidence was a matter of discretion. 
Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 743-44, 9 P.3d 1204, 
1209-10 (2000). That discretion was not abused because there was already 
more than ample evidence in the record by which to determine Martinez's role in 
the robbery (see generally PSI), and because there was no excuse offered for 
why the defense had not felt such evidence important enough to present until 
after the state offered its sentencing recommendations. Martinez has failed to 
show an abuse of discretion in the court's denial of her motion to reopen the 
presentation of evidence at sentencing. 
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III. 
The District Court Did Not Unduly Restrict The Presentation Of Evidence At The 
Hearing On Martinez's Motion For Reconsideration 
Introduction 
After a particularly bad review and request that jurisdiction relinquished 
early (APSI), the district court relinquished jurisdiction (R., p. Martinez 
moved for "reconsideration of the recommendation to relinquish jurisdiction." (R., 
p. 60.) With the motion Martinez submitted several document, including a letter 
from Martinez's mother. (R., p. 71.) At the hearing Martinez moved to present 
testimony from her mother but the district court denied that motion on the basis 
that a hearing had been "held at the facility" and the court does not "do a new 
evidentiary hearing" because a defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing 
on the question of whether to relinquish jurisdiction. (10/20/11 Tr., p. 72, L. 22 -
p. 73, L. 7; p. 89, L. 18 - p. 90, L. 4.) The district court then took argument 
(10/20/11 Tr., p. 73, L. 9 - p. 89, L. 2) and denied the motion (10/20/11 Tr., p. 90, 
L. 4- p. 91, L. 21). 
On appeal, Martinez contends the district court erred by "unduly restricting 
the evidence in the record." (Appellant's brief, p. 13.) This argument fails 
because Martinez has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion 
by limiting the hearing to argument rather than holding an evidentiary hearing on 
her Rule 35 motion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Both an order relinquishing jurisdiction and an order denying a Rule 35 
motion are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 
10 
137, 30 P.3d 290, ). Whether to testimony of a Rule 
motion is a I.C.R. 
C. Martinez Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion By Denying Her Request To Present Testimony From Her 
Mother 
It is "clear that the defendant need not be given a .,. before the 
sentencing court prior a court's decision on relinquishment of jurisdiction." 
State v. Goodlett, 139 Idaho 262, 264, 77 P.3d 487, 489 (Ct. App. 2003). See 
also State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138, 30 P.3d 293 (2001). A Rule 35 motion 
"shall be considered and determined by the court without the admission of 
additional testimony and without oral argument, unless otherwise ordered by the 
court in its discretion." LC.R. 35. "A Rule 35 hearing, if held, takes place after 
the defendant has been accorded his right to be present at sentencing. Thus, 
the sentencing judge may consider and decide the motion without any additional 
testimony." State v. Urias, 123 Idaho 751, 755, 852 P.2d 503, 507 (Ct. App. 
1993). 
The district court had discretion whether to allow oral argument and 
whether to allow the presentation of additional testimony. I.C.R. 35. That it 
allowed the former and disallowed the latter does not show any abuse of 
discretion. 
Martinez argues that once a trial court has a hearing on a Rule 35 motion 
"it is impermissible for the district court to limit the evidence presented at that 
hearing." (Appellant's brief, pp. 15-16.) The very authority Martinez cites for this 
proposition, however, specifically states that a "Rule 35 movant wishing to submit 
11 
additional evidence should make an 'offer of proof in the motion itself or by an 
affidavit to enable the district judge make a reasoned 
on whether to an evidentiary hearing and to create a record upon which 
appellate review be based." State v. Bayles, 131 Idaho 624,962 P.2d 395 
(Ct. App. 1998) (emphasis original, quotations omitted). Because neither 
Martinez's motion nor the attachments thereto presented any offer of proof or 
request to submit additional evidence (R., pp. 60-73) the district court did not err 
by not conducting an evidentiary hearing on Martinez's Rule 35 motion. 
IV. 
Has Martinez Failed To Show That The Cumulative Error Doctrine Applies To His 
Case 
A. Introduction 
Martinez, acknowledging that the cumulative error doctrine is applied to 
trial error, argues that the cumulative error doctrine should be expanded to 
include sentencing and post-sentencing hearings. (Appellant's brief, pp. 16-19.) 
This argument is without merit. 
B. Martinez Has Failed To Show That The Cumulative Error Doctrine Applies 
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of trial errors, harmless in 
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. 
Martinez, 125 Idaho 445,453,872 P.2d 708,716 (1994). A necessary predicate 
to application of the cumulative error doctrine is a finding of more than one error. 
State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). In addition, 
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cumulative error analysis does not include errors neither objected to nor 
fundamental. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho P .3d 961, 982 (2010). 
Martinez correctly acknowledges the cumulative error doctrine in 
Idaho has only been applied in the context a fair trial. ~,State v. Whitaker, 
152 Idaho 945, _, 277 P.3d 392, 399 App. 2012) ("Under the doctrine 
cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in and of themselves, may in the 
aggregate show the absence of a fair " (Emphasis added.)). Martinez's 
argument that the doctrine should be applied to sentencing issues in her case is 
without merit. 
First, there are no errors to cumulate. As set forth above, Martinez had no 
right to confront or cross-examine persons presenting statements considered at 
sentencing; had a full opportunity to present any evidence at sentencing that she 
wished and was merely not excused from her waiver of that opportunity; and had 
no due process right to an evidentiary hearing on her Rule 35 motion. Having 
failed to show error to cumulate, Martinez has failed to show that the cumulative 
error doctrine is applicable to her case. 
Second, Martinez has failed to explain why the errors she claims occurred 
at two different hearings should be cumulated. She claims she was denied a "fair 
sentencing process" (Appellants brief, p. 19), but does not explain how this is so. 
Certainly errors at the Rule 35 hearing could not have resulted in an unfair 
sentencing hearing held months before. Likewise, Martinez has failed to show 
that the alleged errors at the sentencing hearing were relevant to any issue in the 
Rule 35 hearing such that they cumulatively show unfairness in that hearing. 
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Finally, it is established 
to jurisdiction or 
1 idaho 138, 30 P.3d 293 (2001). 
no due process attached to the 
reconsider. State v. Coassolo, 
there was never any due process 
at issue in the Rule 35 hearing, errors therein cannot cumulate into a 
process violation. Likewise, it cannot disputed that the process due in a 
is greater than that due in sentencing. See State v. Guerrero, 130 Idaho 
311, 312, 940 P.2d 419, 420 (Ct. App. 1997) ("restrictive procedural and 
evidentiary rules" applicable at trial not applicable at sentencing). 
Martinez has failed to show that the cumulative error doctrine applies to 
sentencing proceedings, at which less process is due than at trials. Any claim 
the due process based cumulative error doctrine applies at post-sentencing 
hearings at which there is no due process right at ail is even less persuasive. 
Even if the doctrine were applicable generally, there are no errors to cumulate in 
this case. Martinez has therefore failed to show that the cumulative error 
doctrine has any application. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment and order 
denying the Rule 35 motion. 
DATED this 1st day of October, 2012. 
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